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Proportionality as Hidden (but Emerging?)
Touchstone of American Federalism:
Reflections on the Wayfair Decision
Darien Shanske
INTRODUCTION
Until June 2018, a state could not require an out-of-state
vendor to collect its use tax if the vendor did not have a physical
presence in the state. This was the rule in place during the entire
rise of the Internet and of e-vendors such as Amazon, which
scrupulously avoided physical presence in as many states as
possible. The result was a significant tax advantage for remote
vendors as compared to brick and mortar stores, as well as
increasing revenue losses for states and localities. It would be one
thing if the national legislature had decided to confer this dubious
tax advantage, yet this rule emerged not from Congress, but from
the Supreme Court.
In South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc.,1 the Court overturned the
physical presence requirement. In so doing the Court did more than
just take away an unwise tax advantage that remote vendors did
not secure through the political process. The Court also restored the
ordinary constitutional balance in two related ways. First, the
Court restored the states’ power to tax unless Congress has
specifically preempted that power. To be sure, the Court has
restricted the power of state taxation through application of the
dormant Commerce Clause, but modern dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine is generally respectful of the background norm that states
must be permitted the leeway to raise revenue as they see fit.
Thus, and this is the second restoration, the Court corrected
an anomalously formal pocket of dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence where it had crafted a bright-line rule that also
had the effect of reversing the constitutional default in favor of
state power.
The exact impact of the Wayfair decision on the practice and
reality of state and local public finance will take many years to

1

Professor of Law, UC Davis School of Law.
138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018).
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emerge. In this Article, I consider Wayfair in the context of the
Court’s federalism jurisprudence. I argue that restoring the
constitutional balance helps explain why the case came out as it did.
Further, I place the Court’s approach to federalism in broader
perspective, explaining that it illustrates an apt application of the
proportionality principle. The proportionality principle is at the
center of constitutional adjudication around the world and explicitly
so. I demonstrate that this principle is no less powerful in
adjudicating issues arising in our federal system, though typically
under some other nominal analytic structure.
I. HISTORY
First in 1967, and then in 1992, the Court had found that the
federal Constitution required the physical presence rule to
require an out-of-state vendor to collect use tax for that state.2
Even in 1967, this was a controversially formal and novel gloss
on the Due Process Clause and the dormant Commerce Clause.3
By 1992, due process jurisprudence had moved so far from formal
tests that the physical presence rule seemed to have essentially
been overturned, and the North Dakota Supreme Court asserted
as much.4 Getting ahead of the Supreme Court clearly piqued
some members of the Court, though there was unanimous
agreement that, in fact, the North Dakota Supreme Court was
correct as to the Due Process Clause.5 And thus in 1992, in Quill,
the Court made it clear that the physical presence rule was not
required by the Due Process Clause.6 Rather, and distinguishing
the two clauses in this way for the first time, the Court
re-affirmed the physical presence rule, but only as emerging from
the dormant Commerce Clause.7
Shifting the source of the rule had the seemingly momentous
implication that Congress could change the rule if it so chose.8
Yet over the ensuing twenty-five years Congress did not, though
there were numerous proposals to do so. One way of analyzing
2 See generally Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753
(1967); Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992), overruled by South Dakota
v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018).
3 See Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 758. See the powerful dissent written by Justice
Fortas on behalf of three Justices. Id. at 760 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
4 See State ex rel Heitkamp v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d 203 (N.D. 1991).
5 See Quill, 504 U.S. at 308.
6 See id. at 305. Interestingly, it is now the Court’s due process jurisprudence that
leading commentators see as “thinly reasoned,” especially in light of Wayfair. See Allan
Erbsen, Wayfair Undermines Nicastro: The Constitutional Connection Between State
Tax Authority and Personal Jurisdiction, 128 YALE L.J.F. (forthcoming 2019),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3291858.
7 See id.
8 See id. at 318.
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the situation is that Congress was content with the result,
perhaps happy that this rule was shielding an infant industry.
Alternatively, there is an argument that Congress might have
considered overturning Quill if only the states had acted to
simplify their sales and use tax systems sufficiently.9
A counter-narrative argues that Congress, especially the
modern Congress, is designed not to act and that the states simply
could not get quite enough momentum on their side given the
determined opposition of remote vendors, states without sales
taxes and anti-tax activists.10 As an empirical matter, Congress
seems most likely to act in the interstate context in response to
narrow concentrated interests, a finding generally consistent with
public choice theory.11 From this perspective, it would be more
likely that Congress would act to shield specific business interests
from the states should the Quill rule be removed. We will now
have the opportunity to see if this is true, assuming the states
overreach somehow.
Given the magnitude of the revenue loss and competitive
harm they faced, the states became increasingly creative in
asserting nexus even under Quill.12 At the same time, major
players, such as Amazon, now found it in their business interest
to establish a physical presence in multiple states.13 Thus, by
2018, the major harm to the states had, to some extent, been
mitigated. This situation too could be seen in two ways. On the
one hand, one might argue that whatever harm the Quill rule
had done, it was no longer a pressing problem. On the other
hand, one might argue that the Quill rule—ostensibly meant to
help preserve a uniform market—launched dozens of competing
state initiatives to collect the use tax, with more to come as the
online market continued to grow in importance.
II. DECISION
Writing for a 5-4 majority, Justice Kennedy argued that the
Quill rule was always wrong, and it was not the Court’s place to
9 This argument was made by the Respondents in Wayfair. See Respondents’ Brief
at 13–17, South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018) (No. 17-494).
10 I made this argument with a co-author in an amicus brief. See Amicus Curiae
Brief of Four U.S. Senators in Support of Petitioner at 20–24, South Dakota v. Wayfair,
Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018) (No. 17-494).
11 See Brian Galle, Congressional Control of State Taxation: Evidence and Lessons
for Federalism Theory, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF FEDERALISM 1, 3 (Jonathan Klick
ed., 2017).
12 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 12–16, Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S.
298 (1992), overruled by South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018) (No. 01-194).
13 See Amazon’s Physical Presence (Nexus) in States and the Sales Tax Battle, AM.
INDEP. BUS. ALLIANCE (Sep. 27, 2016), https://www.amiba.net/amazon-nexus-subsidiaries/
[http://perma.cc/B3VM-C6M6].
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set down an incorrect rule and then wait for Congress to fix it.14
Going forward, as a matter of doctrine, the majority held that use
tax collection obligations can only be imposed if they satisfy three
tests. First, the use tax collection obligation must satisfy due
process.15 This was already true in Quill.16 Second, the use tax
collection obligation must satisfy the substantial nexus prong of
the Complete Auto test.17 This prong no longer requires physical
presence and we know that the South Dakota statute at issue
satisfies this test.
A state use tax collection requirement must also pass Pike
balancing. This issue was remanded to the South Dakota courts
to consider, though the Court strongly suggested that the South
Dakota statute would survive, explaining that:
First, the Act applies a safe harbor to those who transact only limited
business in South Dakota. Second, the Act ensures that no obligation
to remit the sales tax may be applied retroactively. S.B. 106, § 5.
Third, South Dakota is one of more than [twenty] States that have
adopted the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement. This system
standardizes taxes to reduce administrative and compliance costs: It
requires a single, state level tax administration, uniform definitions of
products and services, simplified tax rate structures, and other uniform
rules. It also provides sellers access to sales tax administration software
paid for by the State. Sellers who choose to use such software are
immune from audit liability.18

III. THE RISE OF PIKE BALANCING
In hindsight, the application of Pike balancing seems obvious.
After all, we all learn in Constitutional Law I that this is the test we
apply to a facially neutral law that arguably nevertheless imposes
too great a burden on interstate commerce. Surely this was the
heart of the claim made by remote vendors who have constantly
reminded the Court of how many thousands of different sales tax
jurisdictions there are in this country.

See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2096–97 (2018).
See id. at 2093.
See id.
See id. at 2099 (“[T]he nexus is clearly sufficient based on both the economic and
virtual contacts [R]espondents have with the State. The Act applies only to sellers that
deliver more than $100,000 of goods or services into South Dakota or engage in 200 or
more separate transactions for the delivery of goods and services into the State on an
annual basis. S.B. 106, § 1. This quantity of business could not have occurred unless the
seller availed itself of the substantial privilege of carrying on business in South Dakota.
And [R]espondents are large, national companies that undoubtedly maintain an extensive
virtual presence.”).
18 Id. at 2099–100.
14
15
16
17
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Nevertheless, Pike’s starring role is surprising. Justice Scalia’s
disdain for Pike balancing is well-known,19 and a great deal of
academic commentary supported his basic point that a balancing
test is inherently uncertain, policy-driven, and legislative.20 The
Court had not struck down a statute using Pike balancing since the
1980s21 and the consensus seemed to be that the Court would not do
so in Wayfair.
This was especially true because the Court seemed to use
two different rubrics for analyzing taxes versus regulations.22
Taxes were subjected to the Complete Auto test,23 which does not
include Pike balancing. However, regulations were subjected to
the usual two levels of test: First facial discrimination analysis,
second Pike balancing.
As evidence of the no-Pike consensus, consider that the
Petitioner in Wayfair—South Dakota did not raise Pike as an
alternative test in its petition for certiorari nor in its merit
brief. The argument first appears in an amicus brief at the
certiorari stage24 and then in several other amicus briefs,
including, notably, that of the Solicitor General. 25 The
Respondents, predictably, dismissed Pike in their merits brief
as “fundamentally unworkable.”26
Yet Pike arose immediately in oral argument at the top of
page four of the transcript during Justice Sotomayor’s opening
questions.27 Note that Justice Sotomayor seemed to be of the
opinion as was the amici who first emphasized Pike that Pike

19 See, e.g., Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 360 (Scalia, J.,
concurring). Justice Gorsuch is clearly not a fan either. See, e.g., Energy & Env’t Legal
Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1171 (10th Cir. 2015).
20 See, e.g., Brannon P. Denning, Reconstructing the Dormant Commerce Clause
Doctrine, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 417, 453–58 (2008) (listing common critiques).
21 BRANNON P. DENNING, BITKER ON THE REGULATION OF INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN
COMMERCE 6–33 (2d ed. 2013).
22 Dan T. Coenen, Where United Haulers Might Take Us: The Future of the
State-Self-Promotion Exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause Rule, 95 IOWA L. REV.
541, 599 (2010); Edward A. Zelinsky, The False Modesty of Department of Revenue
v. Davis: Disrupting the Dormant Commerce Clause Through the Traditional Public
Function Doctrine, 29 VA. TAX REV. 407, 441 (2010).
23 Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
24 See Amicus Curiae Brief of Four U.S. Senators in Support of Petitioner, supra
note 10, at 3.
25 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, South
Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018) (No. 17-494), 2018 WL 1168802; see also
Brief of Brill et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc.,
138 S. Ct. 2080 (No. 17-494), 2018 WL 1203457.
26 Respondents’ Brief at 57, South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (No.
17-494), 2018 WL 1621148.
27 Transcript of Oral Argument at 4–5, South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct.
2080 (No. 17-494), 2018 WL 2446095.
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should be used instead of Complete Auto.28 In Wayfair, the Court
chose to engage in both the Complete Auto and Pike analyses.29
IV. PROPORTIONALITY AS UNDERLYING PRINCIPLE OF HORIZONTAL
FEDERALISM
As a matter of constitutional theory, the proportionality
principle is the dominant mode around the world for adjudicating
claims where there are strong rights-based arguments on both
sides.30 The typical context in which the principle applies occurs
when the rights of an individual, say to privacy or due process,
clash with the right of the collective, say to freedom from harm.31
The proportionality principle permits an abridging of individual
rights, but only if the collective need is sufficiently important and
only to the extent necessary to satisfy that need.
In the context of horizontal federalism, there is also a clash of
rights.32 Indeed, Justice Kennedy, in summarizing dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine, explains that its purpose is “to
accommodate the necessary balance between state and federal
power.”33 Put in the language of rights, there is the right of
subnational governments, here states, to regulate as their citizens
think best. But there is also a right of the collective nation not to be
overburdened by particular state regulations, as well as the rights
of individuals (and businesses) in other states not to be subjected to
“foreign” regulations, let alone burdensome ones. As in the case of
individual rights, application of the proportionality principle in
borderline cases is apt. Pike balancing applies this principle, as does
the very similar search for sufficiently “substantial nexus.”34 It is
the primary contention of this Article that, however implicit and
necessarily messy, the use of proportionality analysis is correct.

See id.
See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2092–93, 2099 (2018).
See, e.g., Bernhard Schlink, Proportionality in Constitutional Law: Why Everywhere
but Here?, 22 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 291 (2012) (explaining and comparing balancing
and proportionality).
31 See, e.g., Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, Proportionality Balancing and Global
Constitutionalism, 47 COLUM . J. T RANSNAT ’ L L. 72, 89 (2008); Vicki C. Jackson,
Ambivalent Resistance and Comparative Constitutionalism: Opening Up the Conversation
on “Proportionality,” Rights and Federalism, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 583, 626 (1999).
32 See Jackson, supra note 31, at 623–34. Jackson’s analysis focuses on the City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), decision, discussed briefly below.
33 Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2090.
34 Adam Thimmesch argues, and I agree, that the substantial nexus prong is
essentially the same as Pike balancing. Adam B. Thimmesch, A Unifying Approach to
Nexus Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, 116 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 101, 106 (2018).
28
29
30
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V. PROPORTIONALITY IS IN: EXTRATERRITORIALITY IS OUT (AND
RIGHTLY SO)35
Towards the end of the briefing in Wayfair, a doctrine credibly
reported as dead36 made a determined attempt to return from the
grave. This doctrine is called the extraterritoriality doctrine,
dubbed by then-Judge Gorsuch as “most dormant.”37 At the
margins, this doctrine is unassailable. California cannot impose a
regulation on farms in Missouri. It would seem like such a law
would fail under any number of constitutional provisions,
including not only the Due Process Clause but also the dormant
Commerce Clause.
On the other hand, California can clearly regulate the food
that is sold in California. The effect of those consumer regulations
might well be felt by farmers in Missouri. Does such a regulation
have a forbidden extraterritorial effect? The answer based on
standard dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence would be to
apply Pike balancing. If the California regulation imposed a
burden on interstate commerce out of all proportion to the benefit
it provides, it would fail.
Yet there is also the extraterritoriality doctrine, which,
according to one formulation, requires a court to determine
“whether the practical effect of the regulation is to control
conduct beyond the boundaries of the State.”38 Such a test would
strike down hundreds of state laws,39 including presumably use
tax collection laws which, of course, are directed at out-of-state
vendors. A strong appeal to the extraterritoriality doctrine was
made by Paul Clement, a former Solicitor General.40
35 Note that this section draws from a White Paper on the dormant Commerce
Clause that was co-written with Anna Zaret. See generally ANNA ZARET & DARIEN
SHANSKE, NAT’L INST. FOR HEALTH POL’Y, THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE: WHAT
IMPACT DOES IT HAVE ON THE REGULATION OF PHARMACEUTICAL COSTS? (2017).
36 See Brannon P. Denning, Extraterritoriality and the Dormant Commerce Clause: A
Doctrinal Post-Mortem, 73 LA. L. REV. 979, 1106 (2013).
37 Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1172 (10th Cir. 2015). Note
that Justice Gorsuch refers to this decision in his concurrence in Wayfair, as an example
of his thinking about the dormant Commerce Clause. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct at 2100–01
(Gorsuch, J., concurring).
38 Healy v. The Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989).
39 See Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 110 YALE L.J. 785, 808 (2001); see also Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and
Interstate Relations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1468, 1486 (2007); Denning, supra note 36, at 1000.
40 See Brief for Amici Curiae Nat’l Taxpayers Union Found. et al., in Support of
Respondents, South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018) (No. 17-494), 2018 WL
1709085, at *6. Clement likely knew that the extraterritoriality argument was made in
Pharma v. Walsh on behalf of the Chamber of Commerce by none other than John
Roberts, now the Chief Justice. See Brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United
States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am.
v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644 (2003) (No. 01-188), 2002 WL 31120077, at *15. It is thus all the
more striking that the argument got no traction at all in Wayfair.
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The Court first invalidated a state law for violating the
prohibition on extraterritoriality in Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig.41 That
case involved a New York state law that banned the sale of milk
produced out-of-state unless the seller paid a minimum price set by
New York when she purchased the milk out-of-state.42 The
unanimous decision said that New York improperly “project[ed] its
legislation” beyond its boundaries by dictating the terms of
transactions that took place in other states.43 The most recent
application of the doctrine was in Healy v. The Beer Institute, where
the Court struck down a Connecticut law that required out-of-state
beer distributors to affirm that their prices in Connecticut “were
and would remain no higher than the lowest prices they would
charge for each beer product in the border [s]tates.”44
It was in Healy where the Court made the sweeping
statement that the inquiry is whether “the practical effect of the
regulation is to control conduct beyond the boundaries of the
State.”45 Since Healy, the Court has not applied the doctrine and,
indeed, the doctrine has been criticized because of its potentially
vast sweep—sweep inconsistent with federalism values. This point
was made in a leading law review article in 2001, and both the
Supreme Court and lower courts seem to have taken its lesson to
heart by allowing the doctrine to become most dormant.46
The leading non-application of the doctrine occurred in
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America v. Walsh
in 2003.47 In that case, Maine enacted a program that encouraged
drug manufacturers to enter into rebate agreements with the
state.48 The rebate agreements allowed Maine to provide residents
with drugs at discounted prices.49 To get drug manufacturers to
enter the agreements, the state decided to impose Medicaid “prior
authorization” procedures on the products of any manufacturer that
refused to join the program.50 The prior authorization procedures
generally made the drug less likely to be prescribed and ultimately
sold to Medicaid patients. Thus, the state threatened to reduce
294 U.S. 511, 519 (1935).
Id.
Id. at 521.
491 U.S. 324, 327 (1989).
Id. at 336.
See Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 39, at 789–90. For the history and similar analysis,
see Denning, supra note 36, at 979. The Goldsmith & Sykes article was cited to in the briefing
in Walsh. Brief of the Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644 (No. 01-188), 2002 WL
31506948, at *23.
47 Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 669 (2003).
48 Id. at 651.
49 Id. at 653–54.
50 Id. at 655.
41
42
43
44
45
46
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manufacturer’s market share and sales unless it joined the
program.51 The drug manufacturers argued that the law
impermissibly regulated out-of-state commerce because it had
the inevitable effect of controlling the terms of out-of-state sales
between manufacturers and wholesale distributors.52 Maine
argued that the only extraterritorial effect of the law was that it
potentially impacted price negotiations between those two parties
by reducing the manufacturer’s revenue.
The Court unanimously agreed that there was no dormant
Commerce Clause violation because the Maine law did not
regulate out-of-state transactions, either “by its express terms or
its inevitable effect,” echoing the conclusion of the First Circuit.53
Accordingly—as Professor Brandon P. Denning wrote in an article
reviewing the rise and fall of the extraterritoriality doctrine—in
the modern era extraterritoriality is “for all intents and purposes,
dead.”54 However, and returning to where we started, a state that
expressly regulates out-of-state conduct directly is a problem. But
that is not the kind of law that is typically at issue. For example,
the use tax collection laws regulate how an out-of-state vendor
must conduct its in-state sales.
Therefore, the extraterritoriality doctrine is not even necessary.
The problem with the linking laws struck down in the leading
extraterritoriality cases can be explained using Pike balancing.55
The problem with linking is that it imposes a significant burden on
interstate business, and for little gain. Indeed, the burden could be
impossible if every state regulated prices based on every other
state’s prices.
It is dangerous to draw conclusions from the dog that did not
bark of course. Still, it is striking that the formal and most
definitely non-balancing test of extraterritoriality got no traction,
even as Pike took center stage.

Id. at 656.
Id.
Id. at 645.
54 Denning, supra note 36, at 1006.
55 Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1173 (10th Cir. 2015). Indeed,
then-Judge Gorsuch and Judge Sutton argued that the extraterritoriality cases also could
have been decided on the basis of illicit discrimination. See also Am. Beverage Assoc.
v. Snyder, 735 F.3d 362, 381 (6th Cir. 2013) (Sutton, J., concurring) (arguing that all
cases that apply extraterritoriality to strike down a state law, involved dormant
Commerce Clause protectionism concerns).
51
52
53
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VI. PROPORTIONALITY AS UNDERLYING PRINCIPLE OF VERTICAL
FEDERALISM
It is worth noting here that the recent leading case on vertical
federalism (NFIB v. Sebelius) also relies on the proportionality
principle. In this area, the question is how to balance the
legitimate desire of the central government to advance national
goals with the ability of the states to choose other goals. The rule
here seems to be that the federal government can do quite a lot to
encourage states, but not too much. Consider the details of the
Court’s ruling on the Medicaid expansion in NFIB v. Sebelius—the
first Obamacare decision.56 The Court made it clear that the
federal government can spend and not spend in order to cajole
the states to cooperate with it. But the federal government cannot
go too far and coerce the states by taking away a major source of
funding on which they had come to rely.57
And proportionality plays an explicit role in another key
vertical federalism decision, City of Boerne v. Flores.58 There the
question is how far Congress’s power extends under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment.59 Clearly Congress’s enforcement
power must extend to protect the rights granted by the
Amendment and, yet, those rights are broad and if Congress’s
enforcement power were also broad, then that would give
Congress an enormous amount of power to preempt state law.
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy, resolved the
conflict between the need of the central government to enforce
national law and that of the states to retain their powers to
regulate by crafting a proportionality test: “There must be a
congruence and proportionality between the injury to be
prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.”60
VII. ANOTHER QUIET DOG: MURPHY V. NCAA
In Murphy v. NCAA,61 a decision authored by Justice Alito,
and joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy,
Thomas, Kagan, and Gorsuch, the Court struck down a federal law
that made it unlawful for states or their subdivisions to authorize
betting on sporting events.62 The majority thought that this

567 U.S. 519 (2012).
For further analysis, see Darien Shanske & David Gamage, The Federal
Government’s Power to Restrict State Taxation, 81 ST. TAX NOTES 547, 550 (2016).
58 521 U.S. 507, 512 (1997).
59 Id. at 516–17.
60 Id. at 520.
61 Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018).
62 Id. at 1468.
56
57
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decision followed from the anti-commandeering principle, namely
that “Congress cannot issue direct orders to state legislatures.”63
Daniel Hemel has made the strong case that this dicta
throws into doubt the many statutes in which Congress tells the
states that they may not tax a given transaction or party.64 After
all, in those statutes, Congress is telling state legislatures what
they cannot do, and as to a matter inherent to their sovereignty,
namely how to raise revenue.
Many commentators replied to Hemel that this cannot be what
Murphy means, offering various arguments as to how the Court
(and in the meantime courts) can follow Murphy but not take it so
far.65 Even the Court does not seem to think that Murphy implies
that Congress cannot preempt state tax legislation, since all nine
Justices in Wayfair seemed to believe that Congress can (and
should) provide uniform ground rules in this area.66 The structure
of such a statute must, out of necessity, forbid state legislatures
from passing certain kinds of tax laws.
But what is the underlying reason that Murphy should not
be read in this way? Put another way, I think there are ways to
distinguish Murphy, but why should we do so? Or rather, why
did it seem obvious to the Justices in Wayfair that Congress can
preempt state taxing power in connection with the use tax no
matter the implication of the dicta in Murphy? Again, I would
argue that it is because the proportionality principle is the proper
way to adjudicate clashes of broad constitutional principles.67 Of
course, the national government must be able to exert some
control over state taxing power, but that control cannot go too
far, or it would undermine the ability of the states to operate
as sovereigns.
The restriction on state legislative power struck down in
Murphy, on this reading, is better understood as the federal
government going too far rather than failing a formal test as to
who it is commandeering.68 Consider how Justice Alito chooses to
Id. at 1478.
Daniel Hemel, More on Murphy—and a Response to Critics, MEDIUM (May 16,
2016), https://medium.com/whatever-source-derived/more-on-murphy-and-a-responseto-critics-471b35c75ecb [http://perma.cc/7YKF-6SZ5].
65 See, e.g., Rick Hills, Murphy v. NCAA’s Escape from Baseline Hell, PRAWFSBLAWG
(May 16, 2018, 7:11 PM), https://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2018/05/murphy-vncaas-escape-from-baseline-hell.html [http://perma.cc/LYS5-8M99].
66 See generally South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018).
67 Brian Galle, for instance, makes a similar argument. See Brian Galle, Murphy’s
(Misguided) Law, MEDIUM (May 15, 2018), https://medium.com/whatever-source-derived/
murphys-misguided-law-8c22889918e4 [http://perma.cc/9XMD-X75N].
68 Obviously, as to Murphy, this requires reading the opinion against itself. See
Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1485.
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develop the facts underlying the case; he starts with: “Americans
have never been of one mind about gambling, and attitudes have
swung back and forth.”69 The federal government has thus taken
a position on a controversial topic on which there is considerable
disagreement and on which there seems to be little imperative
for a national solution.
VIII. WAYFAIR ITSELF AS A BALANCING DECISION
Wayfair was decided 5-4.70 One might assume that the four
dissenters thought that the Quill rule should be upheld because
Quill itself (and Bellas Hess) was correctly decided. For instance,
the Quill rule does arguably provide certainty. Yet, in the end,
not a single Justice would stand up for the rule of Quill; but then
why was this a 5-4 decision?
The four dissenters argued that stare decisis should protect
the Quill rule—even though it was always a mistake—because it
is an old rule that Congress can change.71 I take the key part of
the majority response to be the following:
While it can be conceded that Congress has the authority to change
the physical presence rule, Congress cannot change the constitutional
default rule. It is inconsistent with the Court’s proper role to ask
Congress to address a false constitutional premise of this Court’s own
creation. Courts have acted as the front line of review in this limited
sphere; and hence it is important that their principles be accurate and
logical, whether or not Congress can or will act in response. It is
currently the Court, and not Congress, that is limiting the lawful
prerogatives of the States.72

Put another way, Justice Kennedy is arguing that federalism
values establish a pro-state power default and that it is untenable
for a federal court, as a court, to erect a barrier to state power
based on a mistake.
But note that the dissent’s ode to stare decisis was written by
Chief Justice Roberts,73 who, in another context wrote: “The
dormant Commerce Clause is not a roving license for federal
courts to decide what activities are appropriate for state and local
government to undertake . . . .”74 The issue in that case, United
Haulers Ass’n., Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth.,
was whether a public utility could force local users to use its waste
Id. at 1468.
South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2087 (2018).
Id. at 2102 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 2096–97.
Id. at 2102.
United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S.
330, 343 (2007).
69
70
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72
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treatment services, and Chief Justice Roberts held for the majority
that it could.75 Justice Alito wrote a powerful dissent in this case
and was joined by Justice Kennedy.76 Justice Alito again joined
Justice Kennedy in Wayfair.77 Thus, according to Justices Alito
and Kennedy, a pro-state constitutional default does not protect
local flow control ordinances, but does protect the ability of states
to impose a use tax collection obligation. Note that one cannot
distinguish Wayfair from United Haulers because of stare decisis,
as in both cases there was a precedent on point that had to be
overturned in fact (or de facto, as in United Haulers).
How do we think through this tangle? Through how the
Justices weighed the facts. Consider Chief Justice Roberts. In
United Haulers, Chief Justice Roberts began his decision explaining
why waste treatment was a significant and intractable problem of
the sort that he clearly thought it appropriate for local governments
to solve.78 By contrast, in Wayfair, Chief Justice Roberts
emphasized that the problem of use tax collection had apparently
been largely solved and so there was no reason to destabilize
matters by changing a flawed rule, especially a rule that Congress
could change.79
For Justice Alito in United Haulers (and Justice Kennedy who
signed onto his dissent), opening the door for local governments to
force residents to use their services was sure to lead to wave after
wave of local protectionist strictures.80 For Justice Kennedy in
Wayfair (and Justice Alito who signed on to his majority opinion),81
the states’ struggle to mitigate an incorrect rule while waiting for
Congress to act, was itself a significant harm. Justice Kennedy also
did not agree that the Quill problem had been largely solved.
IX. CONCLUSION: DON’T FEAR THE SCALES
As it turns out, I think Chief Justice Roberts was correct in
United Haulers and that Justices Kennedy and Alito were
correct in Wayfair. What should one make of this dissensus?
Does it not indicate that there is no underlying principle, just
See id. at 347.
See id. at 355 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2087.
United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 334.
See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2103 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“States and local
governments are already able to collect approximately [eighty] percent of the tax revenue
that would be available if there were no physical-presence rule.”).
80 United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 364 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Experience in other
countries, where state ownership is more common than it is in this country, teaches that
governments often discriminate in favor of state-owned businesses (by shielding them
from international competition) precisely for the purpose of protecting those who derive
economic benefits from those businesses, including their employees.”).
81 Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2087.
75
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legislative judgments? Or, if there is a principle, don’t the
different results indicate that the principle is failing to produce
the kind of predictable results required by the rule of law?
These are big questions, and oft-debated ones. I think
considering our little universe of dormant Commerce Clause
cases illustrates why one might be and I am satisfied with
these somewhat unsettled results.
When the Justices engage in proportionality analysis, they are
weighing substantial principles that are in conflict. The resulting
balance between principles is itself a kind of principle. That is,
once a certain judicial balance is chosen, it applies to all states, not
just favored ones. All states can impose a use tax collection
obligation if they follow South Dakota’s lead. All localities can
impose a flow control ordinance directing residents to use a
publicly-owned facility.
This is not like ordinary legislative balancing. A government
needs to set a tax rate or a set of tax rates, and, though this is also
an inexact science, it does not necessarily involve a clash of
principles. No one has a rights-based claim to be in a particular
tax bracket in the abstract. Tax rates reflect a balance of
considerations, but typically not a balance of rights of constitutional
dimension. Further, once the rates are set, the government can give
out and does give out tax breaks reducing the taxes of some for
narrow policy reasons, even if the reasons are daft (and are truly
just political giveaways).
Though proportionality judgments are not merely legislative
judgments, the final balancing as to constitutional principles will
change with time, and with Justices. Is there not something
incongruous about the Court returning to the fray again and
again, often with fractured opinions, in order to achieve balance?
Not if one recognizes that the balancing is itself a requirement
because of the import of the competing imperatives being
considered. Adopting a formal rule is ultimately to discount the
principle on one side, as the Quill rule did violence to the
interests of the states.
Since the balancing must itself be a product of judgment, we
assess its quality except on the basis of how the balancing is
actually done. To some extent, we do not yet know the answer, as
many post-Wayfair “balancings” await the courts. That said, in
upholding the quite reasonable South Dakota statute, the Court
has gotten us off to a promising start.82
82 Hayes Holderness, Navigating 21st Century Tax Jurisdiction (Jan. 11, 2019)
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3314272.
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Even if appropriate for the Court to engage in this kind of
balancing in the abstract, what about the weak textual warrant
for our courts doing so? The textual warrant of the dormant
Commerce Clause is another huge question but note that
fact-intensive inquiries analogous to Pike balancing are a feature
of international trade law that is to agreements that nations
have explicitly negotiated among themselves.83 This makes
sense. Parties to a free trade agreement reasonably desire a
backup test should facially non-discriminatory local laws cause a
discriminatory effect. Thus, Congress has already acceded to
balancing rules in the context of facilitating an international free
trade zone. If Congress passed a law about interstate commerce,
it would presumably use a similar rubric to police the domestic
free trade zone.84 It would then be up to the Supreme Court to
apply that statute and that application would look pretty much
exactly like current dormant Commerce Clause cases. The
Court’s dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence was thus once
prescient and remains necessary. As the Quill saga
demonstrates, throwing matters back to Congress is a fraught
enterprise, even when there is broad consensus as to what should
be done. We are stuck with the dormant Commerce Clause.
In sum, Wayfair holds that the states may impose a use tax
collection obligation on remote vendors, but not if the burden
placed upon them is too great because such a burden undermines
the national marketplace. 85 How much is too much will be
decided via a common law process and that is, I contend, just how
it should be and must be. The only problem with the current
state of affairs is that the operative analytic principle, namely
the proportionality principle, has not been embraced as such by
the Court. Given its cosmopolitan provenance, it seems unlikely
that such an explicit embrace will come anytime soon.

83 See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Robert E. Hudec, Free Trade and the Regulatory
State: A GATT’s-Eye View of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1401, 1421
(1994) (“As is true of DCC doctrine, the GATT law also deals with facially neutral
measures that disadvantage foreign firms compared with domestic ones.”).
84 Indeed, Congress does use the “unreasonable burden” test in narrow interstate
contexts. See 49 U.S.C. § 40116(d) (2018).
85 See supra Part II.
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